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INDIAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL THEORY

THE PARADOXES OF PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
By Brian Leiter*

Philosophy has long been part of the public life of human societies: one need only mention Socrates in
Greece or Confucius in China, or, to leap forward a couple of thousand years, Rousseau in France and
Hegel in Germany to recognize that philosophers can be taken very seriously by the politicians, the
journalists, the ordinary citizens of their eras.
But the idea of “public philosophy” as I will be discussing it here, is an artefact of the professionalization
of the discipline over the past two hundred years, with the rise of research universities and, especially in
the Anglophone world, after World War II, the rise of a professional class of philosophers—
”professional” in the precise sense that they earn their living by teaching and writing about philosophy,
paid either by private or mostly public universities to do so. There are now numerous organizations that
promote “public philosophy,” that seeks to make philosophy “relevant” and “significant” to the broader
culture. These locutions are themselves striking, since philosophy is relevant and significant to anyone-including presumably members of the “public”--who want to know what is true or to know what they do
and do not know, but that is obviously not what is meant by “public philosophy.” Rather, the special
purview of so-called “public philosophy” is to contribute philosophical insight or knowledge or skill to
questions of moral and political urgency in the community in which it is located. So conceived, public
philosophy is an artefact of what is usually called the “neoliberal” way of thinking that has dominated the
capitalist world completely since the 1980s, in which every human activity justifies itself by its
contribution to something for which there is demand in the marketplace. The most extreme form of this
pathology in a country with a formerly preeminent but now declining university system is England, where
philosophers are asked to adduce evidence of their “impact” in order to justify the funding of their
work.1“Impact” here does not mean influencing how other scholars or students think about issues,but
rather such ephemera as appearing on television or having one’s research discussed in a newspaper.

*

Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the Center for Law, Philosophy & Human Values,
University of Chicago. An earlier version was presented as a keynote address at the conference on “Philosophy in
the Public Sphere” at O.P. Jindal Global University on Nov. 7, 2014, where it benefitted from discussion with the
faculty and students in attendance. I am grateful to Dan Telech for excellent research assistance and help in
preparing the article for publication. I may be contacted at bleiter@uchicago.edu.

1

This is not the first time, of course, since the birth of the research universities that philosophers have had to justify
their place in it. But during prior iterations, the question was an intellectually and epistemically serious one. See
FREDERICK BEISER, AFTER HEGEL: GERMAN PHILOSOPHY, 1840-1900 18 (2014) (regarding German academia a bit
before mid-19th-century- “To receive funding, a faculty had to demonstrate that its discipline was legitimate, that it
had its own ‘scientific’ methods, and that it occupied a necessary place in the academic division of labor.”)
Demonstrating the existence of a Wissenschaft, of reliable and rigorous methods for ascertaining knowledge, is quite a
bit different than adducing evidence that The Daily Mail noted one’s research.
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The idea of “public philosophy” so conceived—that is, philosophy as contributing to questions of moral
and political urgency in the community in which it is located—is paradoxical, however, for reasons that I
propose to discuss. The first puzzle may be simply put: normative philosophy has no well-established
substantive conclusions about the right and the good- literally, none!-that could possibly dictate to the
polity at large what should be done. All biologists agree that the theory of evolution by natural selection is
crucial to understanding the diversity of life on the planet; all physicists agree that Newtonian mechanics
gives a correct description of the movement of mid-size physical objects; all moral and political
philosophers agree about nothing, except perhaps the very modest claim that all human beings have equal
moral standing. And they do not even really agree about that, since some major philosophers, like
Nietzsche, deny it; others deny that equality of moral standing attaches to species membership at all; and
all the rest differ so dramatically on what is required for or because of “equal moral standing” that the
apparent agreement is wholly illusory (consider: for Kantians, equal moral standing requires something
like rational personhood; for some utilitarians, something like sentience; for Marxists, something like
needs).2 Moral and political philosophers can not agree about whether the right has priority over the good
or vice versa; they can not agree about what the criterion of human well-being is; they can not agree about
the correct formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative; they can not agree whether agents in the
Rawslian original position would choose deontological or utilitarian principles; and so on.
Agreement may not secure the reliability of the claims agreed upon, of course,3 but such agreement does
seem a prerequisite for successful influence on questions of public interest. Consider a pseudo-science
like economics,4 which in the United States has had considerable influence on public policy. That
economists could present fairly unified fronts for significant periods of time—first, under the Keynesian
umbrella, subsequently under the “Chicago School” umbrella—no doubt lent credence to their claimed
epistemic authority. (Even there, one suspects that non-intellectual factors, such as the extent to which
economic theory tracked the interests of ruling elites, played a decisive role in the triumph of various
economic orthodoxies at the level of policy.) In the United States, at least, that apparent authority may
now be ending, due partly to the very public nature of the disagreements—a result primarily of the
prominent polemics of the Neo-Keynsian Paul Krugman—and partly to what is increasingly apparent,
namely, that macroeconomists, in either camp, have almost no ability to predict any significant economic
events. Putative sciences with no significant predictive power eventually lose credibility.

2

See generally, Brian Leiter, Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche, OXFORD STUD. IN METAETHICS 9 (R.
Shafer-Landau ed. 2014); Cf. Brian Leiter, The Boundaries of the Moral (and Legal) Community, 64 ALA. L. REV. 511-31
(2013).

3

See Derek Parfit, On What Matters (2011) (A leading contemporary moral philosopher, does think such agreement is
essential to secure the objective truth of moral conclusions) .

4

See ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, ECONOMICS: MATHEMATICAL POLITICS OR SCIENCE OF DIMINISHING RETURNS?
(1993) (Regarding the failures of Neoclassical macroeconomics).
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But let us return to philosophy. No philosopher can even pretend to enter the fray of public debate by
reporting, “Philosophers have discovered that rule utilitarianism is the only correct way to assess
questions of public policy.” Nor can any philosopher intervene in a dispute by noting that “such a policy
would be unjust given the Rawlsian difference principle.” The “difference principle”—the idea that
economic rewards should be distributed in such a way as to maximize the position of the economically
worst-off in a society—is not a result or a discovery, but an intuition, the formalization of some vague
feelings about what justice involves. If a society ignores the difference principle—as essentially all do—
there is no discernible consequence. If someone tries to ignore the laws of Newtonian mechanics, the
consequences are immediate!
In short, the first paradox of public philosophy is that philosophers enter into moral and political debate
purporting to offer some kind of expertise, but the expertise they offer can not consist in any credible
claim to know what is good, right, valuable, or any other substantive normative proposition that might be
decisive in practical affairs.
That brings us to the second paradox of public philosophy. If it is not substantive normative knowledge
that philosophers bring to debate, then perhaps it is a method or way of thinking about contested normative
questions that they offer. And this strikes me as a far more plausible suggestion. Starting with certain
normative intuitions, public philosophers work out their entailments, demonstrating claims of the form,
“If you believe X, then you ought to believe Y,” and, “If you believe Y, you should not do Z.” What
philosophers—at least those in the broadly Socratic traditions—are good at is parsing arguments,
clarifying the concepts at play in a debate, teasing out the dialectical entailments of suppositions and
claims, and so on: Socratic philosophers are, in short, purveyors of what I will call “discursive hygiene.”
Although this constitutes a detour from my main claims, I want to emphasize that this conception of
moral and political philosophers as purveyors of discursive hygiene is compatible with the emotivist
theory of normative discourse defended by A.J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson in the middle of the 20thcentury, despite the fact that their meta-ethical views tend to be reviled today by those who think they
somehow distracted philosophers from important normative questions for a long period of time.5 Recall
that for Stevenson ethical judgments express, roughly, an attitude like, “I disapprove of X, do so as well.”
So they express pro- and con- (favorable and unfavorable) attitudes, plus a meta-attitude about the
attitudes others should have. Stevenson thought, correctly I believe, that the emotive meaning of ethical
terms was central to understanding their centrality to social life. Ethical disagreements are at bottom a
function of disagreement in attitudes, rather than disagreements in beliefs (here he follows Ayer): “ethical
argument usually terminates when disagreement in attitude terminates, even though a certain amount of

5

The irony, of course, is that those philosophers who did address “normative” questions never addressed important
ones! See Brian Leiter, Why Marxism Still Does Not Need Normative Theory, 37(2) ANALYSE UND KRITIK 23-50 (2015)
(for the discussion of “bourgeois practical philosophy”) [Hereinafter “Leiter”].
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disagreement in belief remains.”6 (He thinks this counts in favor of explaining what we observe about
moral disagreements, namely, that they often end when we secure agreement in belief, but seem
interminable when they involve disagreements in attitudes.)But this does not mean that all ethical
disagreement is just brute clash of attitudes. As Stevenson writes, “Since attitudes are often functions of
beliefs, an agreement in belief may lead people, as a matter of psychological fact, to agree in attitude” (cf.
there is “the psychological fact that altered beliefs may cause altered attitudes”7).Notice, though, that on
Stevenson’s account, the connection between particular facts and our attitudes is just a contingent
psychological/causal fact: it is just a psychological fact about many creatures like us that if our beliefs change,
our attitudes often change too.8 Philippa Foot, a famous critic of emotivism, emphasized this point: on
Stevenson’s view, she complains, “there are no rules validating particular inferences [from beliefs to
evaluative attitudes], but only causal connexions between the beliefs and attitudes concerned”.9
Was Stevenson wrong in thinking that normative theory operates mainly by exploiting the fact that
creatures like us—or at least some of those creatures—are psychologically disposed to be moved by
certain kinds of inferential connections between our attitudes or between our attitudes and our beliefs?
Around the same time as Foot levelled her critiques of Stevenson’s emotivism, Richard Brandt, in his
1959 textbook Ethical Theory (a really crucial book for anyone who wants to understand the sociology of
Anglophone moral theory in the last half-century), offered a similar challenge. Brandt asks us to imagine
the case of Mr. A and Mr. B who disagree about whether colleges should accept direct grants of money
from the government, Mr. A holding a favorable attitude, Mr. B an unfavorable attitude. Brandt writes:
“We do not consider an argument relevant or well-taken just because it is successful in influencing
attitudes. If Mr. B. is a legislator and Mr. A wants to influence his vote, there are various
“arguments” he might use that no one would think ethically relevant. Mr. A might say: “Your
alma mater will surely go bankrupt unless this bill is passed.” Or, perhaps better, he might say,
“Your daughter will be admitted to ____ College, if you vote for this bill; otherwise she won’t
be.” These arguments may be of wonderful effect in changing Mr. B’s attitudes, but they are not
ethically relevant. On the contrary, suppose Mr. A argues about the importance of having
independent educational institutions, where absolutely uncensored thinking and discussion can
occur.

In this case, Mr. A will have argued relevantly, irrespective of whether Mr. B is

interested.”10

6

Charles L. Stevenson, The Nature of Ethical Disagreement, in FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS: AN ANTHOLOGY,3373(R.
Shafer-Landau & T. Cuneo eds., 2007).

7

Id.

8

Emotivism and non-cognitivism got sidetracked into the Frege-Geach problem. See generally,Mark Schroeder, What
is the Frege-Geach Problem?3(4) PHIL. COMPASS703: 720 (2008).

9

Philippa Foot, Moral Arguments 67 MIND 502-513, 503 (1958).

10

RICHARD BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY: THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND CRITICAL ETHICS 219 (1959).
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Unnoted by Brandt is that the judgment that an attitude-altering argument is not “ethically relevant” is
itself an evaluative judgment, so the expression of another attitude, according to the emotivist. So what
Brandt’s example really illustrates is that we also have pro- and con- attitudes about the kinds of
arguments that influence attitudes, which is hardly surprising. In other words, sometimes we not only
want someone to change their attitude, we want them to do so for a non-self-interested reason, because
we have an unfavorable attitude towards self-interested considerations and a favorable attitude towards
those we denominate “ethical” considerations.11
I believe that Stevenson had it exactly right. Changes in belief do influence changes in attitude, but only as
a contingent, psychological fact: this includes changes in belief about the logical or inferential relations
between beliefs or between beliefs and attitudes. This brings us to the second paradox of public
philosophy. Although philosophers can contribute no substantive knowledge about the good and the
right, they can contribute discursive hygiene. But discursive hygiene plays almost no role in public life, and an
only erratic, and highly contingent, role in how people form beliefs about matters of moral and political
urgency. Both points deserve notice, but they are distinct.
The absence of discursive hygiene in public life should be familiar to any reflective observer. Public
debate, including in democracies, is awash in fallacious inferences, non-sequiturs, and arguments based on
obviously false premises. I shall give just one example, chosen only because it is recent and I know a lot
about it because I was involved in the public debate. The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, a
major public research university in my home state in America, offered a tenured position on its faculty to
a man named Steven Salaita. Dr. Salaita writes about colonialism and the experiences of colonized
peoples, including the Palestinians in the Middle East. (Salaita himself is a Palestinian-American.) He was
offered a tenured position at the University of Illinois in October 2013, accepted it fairly quickly, and the
University began making arrangements for his arrival and for his teaching to start in late August of 2014.
Dr. Salaita is also an active user of social media, including Twitter. In response to the Israeli attack on
Gaza in the spring and summer of 2014, Dr. Salaita began “tweeting” vigorous moral outrage at the
slaughter of children and civilians, and at the apologists for these crimes, and began expressing himself in
increasingly vulgar and hostile terms. I will give just one example. Dr. Salaita re-posted on his Twitter
page a comment someone else made about an American journalist named Jeffrey Goldberg, who is an
utterly shameless and morally bankrupt apologist for any crimes committed by Israel. Here is the
statement that Dr. Salaita “re-tweeted”:
Jeffrey Goldberg's story should have ended at the pointy end of a shiv.
A “shiv,” for those who do not know, is a sharp knife, like the kind that might also be known as a
“bayonet” attached to a rifle. The most natural reading of this tweet—contrary to some defenders of Dr.

11

The point extends to our epistemic attitudes on my view, though I do not discuss that here. See Brian Leiter,
Moralities are a Sign-Language of the Affects, 30 SOC. PHIL & POL’Y 237-258, 253-255 (2013).
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Salaita—was that he wished Goldberg dead. That’s not a nice sentiment, but it is not illegal in the U.S. to
express such a wish on your Twitter account, and far more illustrious writers than Dr. Salaita have made
the same point. We need only recall Heinrich Heine, one of the great German writers of the 19th-century,
who famously expressed the wish that “if God wants to make my happiness complete, he will grant me
the joy of seeing some six or seven of my enemies hanging from [the] trees” in front of his cottage.12 It is
easy enough to understand how someone who believes his people are the victims of violent oppression
might wish apologists for this oppression dead.
We only know about this “tweet” because, in the United States, there are a large number of so-called
“conservative”--mainly reactionary and crypto-fascist--websites and media outlets devoted to monitoring
and harassing university professors who deviate from what they regard as “acceptable” opinion. These
websites began publicizing other examples of offensive, sometimes vulgar “tweets” by Dr. Salaita in July
of this year. Soon alumni and wealthy donors to the University of Illinois began complaining to the
University about this prospective hire. Although the tenured appointment had been approved by the
Department, by the Dean, and by the Provost a year ago, the Chancellor on August 1 of this year notified
Dr. Salaita she would not forward the appointment to the Board of Trustees for final approval (ordinarily
pro forma in every prior case).
From a legal point of view, the issues here are fairly clear-cut. In the United States, it is illegal for a public
university to deny employment to someone because of their political point of view: that violates their
constitutional right to free speech and freedom of association. Citizens also have a well-established
constitutional right in the United States to express their political views in vulgar and offensive terms.13
From a constitutional point of view, these claims are banal and familiar to lawyers and scholars. Yet the
Chairman of the University’s Board of Trustees, in justifying the firing of Dr. Salaita, declared that “there
can be no place” for “disrespectful and demeaning speech”“in our democracy, and therefore, there will be
no place for it in our university.” As a factual matter, there is quite a lot of disrespectful and demeaning
speech in American democracy, and, more importantly, the University of Illinois, as a public university,
and thus subject to constitutional limits, must permit such speech, at least to the extent it takes place
outside the classroom. (Inside the classroom, it likely would disrupt the university’s pedagogical mission,
and so could be regulated, but that was not at issue here.) The Chairman went further, saying that he
believes only in “free speech tempered in respect for human rights.” There are some countries where this
statement would make sense: in Germany, for example, human dignity is the fundamental constitutional
value, which can trump freedom of expression. But American constitutional law is the opposite of
12

Heinrich Heine, Gedanken und Einfällein SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 21 59-145
(1930).

13

Salaita v. Kennedy et. al,, 1:15-cv-00924, No. 59 (N.D.Ill. 2015). (A federal court in the United States has since
rejected an attempt by the University of Illinois to dismiss Prof. Salaita’s lawsuit, affirming that he clearly had valid
legal claims. The University subsequently paid out nearly a million dollars to settle his claim.)
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German: there is no doctrine of “free speech tempered in respect for human rights,” what is called in
other jurisdictions “hate speech” is fully protected under American law. Anyone interested in the
prospects of public philosophy should think hard about this case: we have a public official, the Chairman
of the Board of Trustees of a major public university in the United States, who is completely ignorant of
the basic facts of American constitutional law, making assertions that are both false and, if implemented,
wholly illegal.

Can one imagine the travesty that would result were there to be subtle issues of

philosophical argumentation at stake?
Alas, this public stupidity was not anomalous in this affair. Chicago’s leading newspaper, the Chicago
Tribune, defended the decision14 to fire Salaita on the grounds that his critical comments constituted “hate
speech.” I want to emphasize that Chicago is the third largest city in the United States, and this
newspaper serves a community of eight million people: after The New York Times, the Tribune is one of the
three or four most significant newspapers in my country. Yet nowhere does the editorial defending the
obviously illegal firing of Salaita even mention that “hate speech” is constitutionally protected in the
United States. The editorial does not even mention that under most “hate speech” legislation in other
countries that I have seen, nothing Salaita said would qualify.
I must underline that I am here talking about clear points of law, not hard philosophical questions. Yet the
editors of a major American newspaper and the public official chairing a major American University’s
Board of Trustees do not even understand simple legal points, and so make claims and arguments that are
false and fallacious. I wish this problem were only confined to the United States, but I am sure I do not
need to persuade members of this audience that it is, sadly, not.15 So what hope is there for public
philosophy—for the discursive hygiene that philosophers can offer—in a world like this?
That discursive hygiene should be almost wholly absent from public debate is not surprising given the
psychological evidence that people’s beliefs about matters of moral and political urgency—and, perhaps,
more important, what they do based on those beliefs—are only slightly influenced by a regime of
discursive hygiene; instead, their emotional and affective responses mostly determine their moral
attitudes. Consider the psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s famous work on the “social intuitionist” model of
moral judgment,16 according to which in most ordinary situations, moral judgments are produced by
emotional or affective responses, the reasons adduced in their support being post-hoc: they do not
14

U. of I. right to reject prof’s hate speech, CHICAGO TRIBUNE Sept. 11, 2014 at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-salaita-u-of-i-professor-hate-speech-edit-091120140911-story.html

15

See e.g., Pankaj Mishra, Modi’s Idea of India, INT’L N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 25-26, 2014 6-7 (which discusses the
outrageous historical fabrications and misunderstandings common among the Hindu nationalists, who claim Modi
as their leader).

16

Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,108 PSYCHOL.
REV. 814–834 (2001).
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explain the judgment, as evidenced by the resilience of the judgment even in the face of the defeat of the
proferred reasons. Thus, in one famous case, Haidt describes to experimental subjects the case of a
brother and sister who decide, after discussion, to experiment with incestuous sex. All the experimental
subject thinks this is wrong, but the scenario, as described by Haidt, rules out all the reasons for thinking it
wrong: the brother and sister only do it once, they do it voluntarily and are happy with the experiment,
they use birth control to insure no pregnancy results, no one knows what they did, and so on. But
people’s visceral reaction remains powerful and unshakeable, even when the reasons they give for their
judgment are defeated by the facts of the hypothetical. In the realm of ordinary moral judgment, emotion
trumps reason.
We also know from work in empirical psychology that individuals “with selective deficits in emotional
processing” due to disease or injury to the brain render different moral judgments about hypothetical
situation like the Trolley cases, than most emotionally normal subjects to hypothetical situations,17
suggesting that the emotional responses are the real causes of the moral judgments.

Psychologist and

philosopher Joshua Greene has argued18 that emotional responses loom larger in deontological than
consequentialist moral judgments, the latter demanding more “controlled cognition,”19but in more recent
work even Greene has acknowledged that “affect [or emotion] supplies the primary motivation to view
harm as a bad thing” in the first place, so that even consequentialist reasoning has “an affective
basis.”20More precisely, according to Greene et al. “affect supplies the primary motivation to regard harm
as bad. Once this primary motivation is supplied, reasoning proceeds in a currency-like manner
[“currency emotions are designed to participate in the process of practical reasoning”]”.21 “[A]larm-bell
emotions are designed to circumvent reasoning” and, arguably, this is “the origin of the welfare
principle”.22
In a recent review of the empirical literature, Timothy Schroeder, Adina Roskies and Shaun Nichols
found that the view they dub “sentimentalism”—namely, the view that “the emotions typically play a key
causal role in motivating moral behavior”23 —is well-supported by the “evidence from psychology and

17

Fiery Cushman & Liane Youn et. al. Multi-System Moral Psychology, THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY HANDBOOK 53–54
(J. M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group eds., 2010).

18

Joshua Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 35–117 (W. Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2007).

19

Cushman et. al., 54 (2010).

20

Id. at 62.

21

Id. at 63.

22

Id. at 62, 63.

23

Timothy Schroeder et. al., Moral Motivation, THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY HANDBOOK (J. M. Doris and the Moral
Psychology Research Group, eds. 2010) 77.
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neuroscience”24 and that while “motivation derived [exclusively] from higher cognitive centres
independently of desire is possible…the only known model of it is pathological” involving Tourette
syndrome.25 Such empirical findings do not rule out the possibility that moral judgments can be
influenced by what I have been calling discursive hygiene, but they certainly explain why so much of
public discourse is manifestly irrational and emotion-driven.
But the research on the role of irrational emotional responses to moral questions is just the tip of the
iceberg. The real problem, of course, is that prejudice and bias are dominant forces in human life. What I
will call Tribalism—the propensity of creatures like us to identify with those “like themselves,” and to
view others as unacceptably different, deficient, depraved, and perhaps dangerous26—is, as any realistic
appraisal of human affairs will reveal, the dominant force in public life. Tribalism—whether it is Irish
Catholics killing Irish Protestants, or Sunni Muslims terrorizing Shia Muslims, or working class American
whites hating working class American blacks—is the curse of our species, against which discursive
hygiene is the feeblest of weapons. As Nietzsche observed, “Nothing is easier to wipe out than a
dialectical effect” (TI II: 6), and he was only thinking of Socrates’s argumentative harassment of the rich
youth of Athens. Given that Tribalist prejudices engage a range of powerful emotions—pride, selfrespect, resentment, and others—how can discursive hygiene make an impact?
It may be said that Tribalism’s terrain has receded, especially in the last two hundred years, and that
certainly seems to be true in various parts of the world. But we may reasonably ask what role discursive
hygiene actually played in this process? Consider that the post-World War II consensus that emerged in
many democracies about the importance of “universal human rights” only emerged after the ghastly
slaughters that resulted from the extreme Tribalism of German and Japanese fascists and racists.
Argument played little or no role; emotional revulsion at barbarity did.

Yet Tribalist loyalties and

prejudices remain ferocious, in America, in Iraq, in Israel, in India, in Pakistan and elsewhere. The great
cosmopolitan ideal of the 19th-century, famously expressed by Karl Marx, was that, “Human
emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has…in his everyday life, in his work,
and in his relationships…become a species-being [Gattungswesen],”27 that Marxian ideal of human beings who
recognize their social and existential interdependence in producing the conditions of their existence qua
human beings, but who no longer identify as simply the self-interested members of their tribes. That
Marxian ideal remains an aspiration, even as some tribalist loyalties have receded over the last century.

24

Id. at 98.

25

Id. at 94.

26

See DAVID LIVINGSTONE SMITH, LESS THAN HUMAN: WHY WE DEMEAN, ENSLAVE, AND EXTERMINATE
OTHERS(2011) (For a striking catalogue of the extreme version of this phenomenon).

27

KARL MARX, ON THE JEWISH QUESTION THE MARX-ENGELS READER (R.Tucker ed. 2nd ed. 1978) 46.
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The key point, however, is that we philosophers must recognize that moral change depends
fundamentally on the emotional attitudes of people, and that these attitudes tend in a strongly Tribalist
direction. And the most plausible explanations for the evolution of such attitudes do not, alas, assign
much role to discursive hygiene.28 Consider selectionist explanations, which are all the rage these days in
philosophy and the social sciences. These explanations appeal to evolution by natural selection, as
opposed to all the other evolutionary mechanisms (e.g., genetic hitchhiking or genetic drift) that affect the
evolution of species. Such explanations have serious limitations,29 but they do help explain the persistence
of tribalist tendencies. First, these explanations concern only the evolutionary explanation of altruism, that
is, concern for others, a kind of concern that can, of course, be far more tepid than considering the
“other” to be a full-fledged member of the non-tribal moral community, whose suffering, for example,
has as much moral salience as the suffering of anyone else. Second, the only well-confirmed and generally
accepted evolutionary hypothesis in the literature--deriving from the work of biologist W.D. Hamilton-involves altruistic concern for kin, that is, for organisms that share some of the genetic make-up of the
altruist. From a selectionist point of view, so the Hamiltonian argument goes, altruistic concern for kin
can be highly effective in passing on genetic material to the next generation as long as that concern is
directed towards kin, such as sisters or cousins or aunts who have some of the same genetic material.
Thus, natural selection will select for a genetic predisposition to nurture and sustain kin, since they too
can pass the genetic inheritance on. That, of course, is a far cry from viewing non-kin, indeed utter
strangers, regardless of race or religion or tribe, as entitled to basic moral consideration, but it is certainly
consistent with the Tribalism we observe. Third, even the more ambitious selectionist arguments for
“group selectionism,” associated with Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson,30 would still fail to explain
the evolution of moral sensibilities beyond tribalist ones, since, at best, these arguments tell us why
individuals might develop altruistic concern for members of their group who are not kin; they do not explain
why human communities might come to adopt non-tribalist moral ideals.
Doubts about the prospects of discursive hygiene are strikingly illustrated by considering the case of Peter
Singer, undoubtedly the most successful “public philosopher” in the Anglophone world in recent years,
though in a somewhat schizophrenic way: he is lauded for his defense of the rights of non-human
animals, but also denounced (indeed, sometimes banned from speaking--in Germany, for example31) for
28
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his willingness to approve of the killing of defective human beings.

Singer is, however, a paragon of

consistent discursive hygiene. He has argued, on the one hand, that our treatment of non-human animals
is morally indefensible, since the suffering of a sentient creature is what is morally salient,32 not the
species of the sufferer. Yet, on the other hand, he has argued that it can be morally justifiable to kill
human infants afflicted with various kinds of cognitive and physical defects, since to allow them to live
would, over the long term, produce more suffering than happiness. If one thought infanticide was morally
abhorrent—as a matter of brute moral attitude—then one might take Singer’s position as a simple
reduction of the idea that suffering per se is the only thing that is morally relevant, since it leads to an absurd
and heinous conclusion. Singer has no actual argument against such a response, since his entire position
rests simply on an equally brute, and unexplained, emotional attitude, namely, that suffering per se is
abhorrent.33But if the consequence of believing that suffering per se (regardless of species) is the only thing that is
morally salient leads to the conclusion that it is permissible to kill human babies with defects, it is equally
reasonable to take that to show that species membership (namely, being human) is morally salient, since it
explains why killing human babies is wrong, even when their cognitive and physical defects will impose
burdens on others. That this rather obvious point is not much acknowledged in the philosophical
literature should make even philosophers wonder what role discursive rationality as opposed to other forces
are playing in their arguments.
From a serious philosophical point of view, of course, it should hardly be surprising that it is not
rationally obligatory to think the suffering of non-human animals is on a par with that of humans. More
general lessons of twentieth-century philosophy, I believe, show that no belief about any subject-matter is
rationally obligatory for all agents regardless of their ends. First, from the famous Duhem-Quine thesis,34
about the under-determination of scientific theories by evidence, we know that there are not even any
scientific hypotheses that are rationally obligatory, in the sense of required by logic and evidence. This is
because any recalcitrant evidence elicited in a test of an hypothesis is compatible with the hypothesis as
long as we are willing to give up the background assumptions such a test requires. In choosing among
competing hypotheses and background assumptions, we must always fall back on non-rational
considerations, such as theoretical simplicity, methodological conservatism, and consilience.35 Second,
unless there were a plausible substantive conception of rationality (there does not appear to be one,
alas),then rationality itself is instrumental, imposing normative constraints only on the means chosen to
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realize our ends, whatever they may happen to be. Thus, even norms for belief are hostage to ultimate
ends, and so particular beliefs are “irrational” only relative to the believer’s ends.36 Neither Singer nor
anyone else can show that one is rationally required to rule out ends (like forbidding infanticide) which
require as a matter of instrumental reasoning the repudiation of the moral salience of suffering without
regard to species.
Given our general epistemological predicament—namely, that no belief is rationally obligatory--it
becomes even more interesting to ask what role discursive hygiene can play in public life? Even Peter
Singer has acknowledged,37 that one of the most influential parts of his 1975 book Animal Liberation,38 was
not the Benthamite argument mentioned already, but rather the emotionally evocative description of
factory-farming practices in Chapter 3 of his book. These descriptions evoked the suffering of sentient
creatures, and so elicited feelings of compassion from readers quite effectively. But from Singer’s
perspective, the moral salience of suffering also entails the moral permissibility of infanticide, and it is
easy enough to see that even a rather discreet description of infanticide factories or hospices (call them
what you want) would immediately elicit a very different set of moral intuitions and feelings. Clearly our
emotional responses to vivid descriptions of factory-farmed chickens and the painless killing of defective human
babies are not going to yield a rational verdict about the moral propriety of either practice.39
So if Tribalism and emotion dominate most moral thinking in the public sphere, should we simply not
bother with “public philosophy”? That is not, in fact, the skeptical conclusion I draw and it is important
to emphasize why. First, of course, some of us, both citizens and philosophers, want to try to reason our
way to sound views of moral and political questions of public significance, despite the irrational and
Tribalist tendencies of most public discourse. That may effectively render “public philosophy” private,
defeating its originally neoliberal rationalization: but perhaps that needs to be acknowledged. The primary
reason for trying to figure out what is right and wrong in public affairs is to figure out what is right and
wrong (assuming there might be facts of the matter about this), not necessarily to influence public policy.
Second, let us also remember that we do not understand well the conditions under which discursive
hygiene matters to public policy over the long haul, and that is an additional reason for philosophers to
continue trying to cleanse public debate and reasoning of its fallacies and non-sequiturs: discursive
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hygiene may lead philosophers to satisfactory conclusions about the right and the good, but it also may,
through causal channels we do not yet understand very well, lead society to similar conclusions.
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, we do know that the discipline closest to philosophy—namely,
law—is grounded in a commitment to discursive hygiene as well, albeit less rigorously and formally.
Judges give reasons for their decisions, and those reasons are based on premises, from which inferential
steps purportedly follow. Judges are influenced by a myriad of non-legal factors, but discursive hygiene
matters to them, as even those great skeptics of 20th-century Anglophone jurisprudence, the American
Legal Realists, repeatedly emphasized. Let us recall the anecdote invoked by Jerome Frank, one of the
two most important American Realists and the most skeptical of the group; he observed:
A century ago a great American judge, Chancellor Kent, in a personal letter explained his method
of arriving at a decision. He first made himself “master of the facts.” Then (he wrote) “I saw
where justice lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time. I then sat down to search
the authorities…I might once in a while be embarrassed by a technical rule, but I almost always
found principles suited to my view of the case….40
Frank took this to be illustrative of the general form of legal decision-making by judges, namely, that they
arrive at their decision based on their “moral sense” about what would be a fair outcome given what
happened In this regard, Frank’s picture is still consistent with Haidt’s “social intuitionist” model of
moral judgment. But notice that the account Frank endorses has two other striking features: first, judges,
on Frank’s picture, still want to find legal principles that will justify deductively the conclusion they find
morally attractive; and second, judges can still be “embarrassed by a technical rule,” that is, they can come
to recognize that the result they deem fair is not permissible discursively because of the logical entailments
of the controlling legal rules. Those concessions by a radical skeptic like Jerome Frank about rational
decision-making about practical questions should remind us that even in the sphere of emotional reaction
and Tribalism, discursive hygiene can still exert pressures. Public philosophy can contribute to those
pressures.
This will no doubt seem too tepid a conclusion to those whose vision of philosophy is different than
mine. But, like the Skeptics of antiquity, and like the great modern skeptics about reason, namely, Hume
and Nietzsche, I think we must recognize that reason underdetermines what to believe, even in the best
of circumstances, and that, unsurprisingly, in the worst of circumstances--such as public discourse--nonrational factors overwhelm all others. We philosophers labor at the margins of public life, public life being
dominated by irrational emotion and Tribalist prejudice. But in ways we can not always anticipate, our
labors in the service of discursive hygiene may matter. Law is our ally in this regard, because lawyers are
the practical torchbearers of discursive hygiene.

But lawyers understand something that most

philosophers—the Sophists, Marx, and Nietzsche are prominent exceptions—do not understand, namely,
that rhetoric--the art of persuasion apart from appeal to what follows from discursive hygiene—matters,
40
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and often matters decisively, in what the public believes. “Belief fixation,” the process by which certain
beliefs take hold in the cognitive and affective economy of the mind and thus yield action, does not
necessarily track evidential, inferential and logical relations that interest philosophers: the empirical
evidence for that is, by now, overwhelming. Rhetoric was always, from the Sophists onward, the art of
producing belief fixation, and it is not taught sufficiently either in law or philosophy faculties.
Of course, rhetoric does not tell us what beliefs we should try to produce with our rhetorical tools, but for
reasons I have already discussed, it is doubtful that discursive hygiene will help us on this score. The two
great polemicists of modern philosophy, Marx and Nietzsche, understood this, despite their differences in
moral attitudes. Marx did not engage in public philosophy in the sense now fashionable in professional
philosophy: he did not offer reasons why the abolition of capitalism was just or morally obligatory.41
Instead, Marx offered a causal-explanatory theory of historical and economic change, taking for granted
that as capitalism immiserated the mass of humanity, the understanding of how things really work would
suffice to produce action, since the motivations of the vast majority to change things could be taken for
granted. Nietzsche, by contrast, viewing almost all philosophy in the Socratic tradition as a kind of fraud,
the attempt to rationalize the emotional prejudices of particular cultures, or particularly sick individuals
(as Nietzsche viewed most philosophers), wanted to displace it with a self-conscious “legislation of
values,” values in the service of making life worth living. For Nietzsche, this meant living in a world in
which genius and its aesthetically pleasing products prevailed, something to which he thought the ascetic
moralities of the last two thousand years constituted obstacles. Marx and Nietzsche both were “public
philosophers”—Marx during his lifetime in some measure, Nietzsche only afterwards—and both on a
scale undreamed of by any academics of the last hundred years, yet neither was primarily a practitioner of
discursive hygiene in the sense of neoliberal “public philosophy.” There may be an important lesson in
this fact for aspiring “public philosophers,” who should give at least as much attention to rhetoric as to
discursive hygiene. We need discursive hygiene for the study and the seminar room; but in public, we
need something else, something much more important, namely, rhetorical skill that will make our
academic conclusions salient to a public too often influenced by emotion and Tribalist sympathies.
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